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HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS AND FETAL 
PROTECTION POLICIES: WOMEN ARE GOING BACK 
TO THE FUTURE 
J ani F. Katz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Women should be barefoot, pregnant, and in the kitchen." This 
message is being echoed by numerous employers who have instituted 
fetal protection policies. Fetal protection policies exclude pregnant 
and fertile women from jobs because the particular work environ-
ment is considered hazardous to the reproductive health of women 
and to the health of their offspring.l 
There is a large number, and possibly millions, of jobs involving 
chemicals with reproductive effecLs.2 Furthermore, there is evidence 
that the continuing high-technology revolution may escalate the 
number of jobs that adversely affect reproductive capacity.3 Conse-
* Clinical Placement Director, 1989-90, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW 
REVIEW. 
1 See Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1219 (1986). 
2 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on Reproductive and Fetal 
Hazards 1 n.2 (approved October 3, 1988) (on file with author) (to be filed in 2 EEOC, 
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 624 (policy on reproductive and fetal hazards)) [hereinafter EEOC 
Policy Guidance]. In 1987, it was estimated that fifteen to twenty million jobs involved 
chemicals with reproductive effects. See id. A more recent study, done in Massachusetts in 
1988, surveyed 198 firms and found that 53% of those firms reported the use of at least one 
of four chemicals known to affect reproduction, namely, glycol ethers, lead, organic mercury, 
and radiation. See Butterfield, Study Says Job Hazards Go Unrecognized, Boston Globe, Nov. 
11, 1988, at 1, 12. 
3 See Lewin, Protecting the Baby: Work in Pregnancy Poses Legal Frontier, N. Y. Times, 
Aug. 2, 1988, at AI, A15, col. 3. In 1987, a study by the University of Massachusetts found 
a higher rate of miscarriages among women whose jobs exposed them to the manufacture of 
computer chips. [d. In June of 1988 another study provided evidence that women who work 
with video display terminals also had a higher rate, almost double, of miscarriages. [d. at 
A15, col. 3. 
The recent findings that various jobs in high-technology companies pose reproductive haz-
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quently, pregnant and fertile women in the high-technology and 
chemical industries, such as electronic companies, chemical compa-
nies, manufacturing companies, microchip factories, laboratories, au-
tomated office environments, and other working environments in-
volving reproductive hazards, could be fired from their jobs. 4 
Employers who remove women from these hazardous working en-
vironments justify their actions as necessary to protect the women 
and their future offspring. 5 
Although worker protection is the goal of both the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)6 and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,7 the scenario presented by reproductively hazardous 
workplaces appears to bring these two Acts into conflict. The OSH 
Act requires employers to provide a safe workplace for all employ-
ees,8 while Title VII prohibits employment exclusion based on sex. 9 
Fetal protection policies provide a safe workplace at the expense of 
excluding fertile and pregnant women from the workplace. lO Such 
policies undermine the OSH Act in the sense that the OSH Act 
encourages employers to abate hazards before taking action detri-
mental to the employees. 11 An employer who merely excludes a 
particular class of employee, failing to take action to abate the haz-
ard, thus undermines the OSH Act. 
Fetal protection policies also undermine the purpose of Title VII. 12 
Title VII dictates that women should be treated equally with men, 
ards have prompted action to increase recognition industry-wide. A 1988 Massachusetts study 
calls for education of employers and workers in the high-technology industry regarding re-
productive hazards as well as the creation of a special task force. Butterfield, Study Says Job 
Hazards Go Unrecognized, Boston Globe, Nov. 11, 1988, at 12. 
4 See supra notes 2--3 and accompanying text. 
5 Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection 
with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 644 (1981). 
629 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
742 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
8 See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982). 
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
10 See Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 318, 352 (1987). 
11 See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. 
12 Title VII states that: 
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse 
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . . or (2) to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
1989] FETAL PROTECTION 203 
and that women should have the power to make their own decisions 
regarding employment. 13 Fetal protection policies deprive women of 
their power to decide and erode equality in the workplace. The 
United States Circuit Courts have helped undermine Title VII by 
rubber-stamping the validity of fetal protection policies. 
To date, none of the circuit courts have upheld a specific fetal 
protection policy under a Title VII theory.14 Nevertheless, the dis-
torted framework the courts have given Title VII in fetal protection 
cases rubber-stamps the legality of such policies. 15 The framework, 
in effect, rekindles the arguments that were once advanced in favor 
of sex-specific protective labor legislation. 16 Unless employees chal-
lenge the legality of these policies, vast numbers of women could 
find themselves back in the days when discrimination was an ac-
cepted societal norm. 17 
This Comment challenges the validity of fetal protection policies 
on two grounds. First, Title VII dictates that an employer cannot 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as 
an employee, because of such individual's ... sex. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
For discussion of how courts have .allowed fetal protection policies to undermine Title VII, 
see infra notes 107-96 and accompanying text. 
13 See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,236 (5th Cir. 1969). 
14 Only three such cases have been decided in the circuit courts under Title VII. See Hayes 
v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (lith Cir. 1984) (court deemed the policy discrimi-
natory because employer showed no substantial danger to fetus, thereby failing to establish 
appropriate defense); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) (remanded to 
determine legality of fetal protection policy under the disparate impact theory of Title VII); 
Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (fetal protection policy was not 
the least restrictive alternative, therefore the policy was discrimination based on sex). The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also heard a case concerning a fetal protection policy 
on September 15, 1988, which was reheard en bane in June 1989, but its decision is still 
pending. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 88-1308 (7th Cir. argued 
Sept. 15, 1988, reargued en bane June 1989). The plaintiff appealed the lower court's decision 
in Johnson Controls for two reasons: (1) impropriety of summary judgment for employer in 
light of conflicting scientific evidence regarding substantial harm to women only; and (2) failure 
to explore less discriminatory alternatives. Id. In the analogous case of Oil, Chemical & 
Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court applied 
the OSH Act standard. The standard required American Cyanamid to provide each of its 
employees with a safe working place free from recognized hazards likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm. See id. at 447. The court in American Cyanamid did not find, however, 
that sterilization as a condition of employment constituted a "hazard" under the general duty 
clause of the OSH Act, and, therefore, upheld the fetal protection policy. Id. at 450. 
15 See infra notes 107-55 and accompanying text. 
16 See generally Becker, supra note 1, at 1221-43. The essence of the protective labor 
legislation was that "healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-
being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength 
and vigor of the race." Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). 
17 See We Only Want What's Best For You, STUDENT LAW., Nov. 1988, at 4. 
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institute a policy that overtly discriminates against women unless a 
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense is estab-
lished. 1s Second, the United States Constitution protects a woman's 
choice regarding procreation and prohibits interference with this 
choice except under narrow circumstances. 19 Title VII precedent, 
coupled with the right to privacy implications of fetal protection 
policies, mandates importing the constitutional privacy concerns to 
Title VII and invalidating the distorted Title VII framework courts 
have used to rubber-stamp fetal protection policies. 
Section II of this Comment discusses the statutory protection 
afforded workers. It begins by setting out the history of Title VII 
and its analytical framework, as well as the impact of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA)20 on Title VII analysis. It then briefly 
discusses the OSH Act standards. Section III presents the two most 
prevalent reasons offered in support of fetal protection policies. 
Section IV analyzes how courts have applied Title VII in fetal pro-
tection cases. Section V discusses how the courts have distorted the 
traditional Title VII framework to rubber-stamp the validity of fetal 
protection policies and the constitutional right to privacy implications 
that result from these policies. Finally, this Comment proposes an 
alternative to fetal protection policies. This alternative involves an 
educational program coupled with an employment options program 
designed to assist women in making their own decisions. 
II. WORKER PROTECTION 
A. History of Title VII and Its Analytical Framework 
Historically, there are two categories of Title VII violations: (1) 
employers classifying employees on the basis of one of the statutorily 
specified characteristics, and (2) employers classifying employees on 
the basis of a neutral characteristic, when such classification leads 
to a disparate impact upon a protected class. 21 The first step in any 
Title VII case requires that a plaintiff establish a prima facie case 
18 See infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 197-212 and accompanying text. 
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). 
21 Williams, supra note 5, at 668-69. Williams discusses three frameworks of Title VII. See 
id. For purposes of discussion in this Comment, the author has consolidated facial discrimi-
nation with pretext discrimination because both are considered under the disparate treatment 
theory. See id. at 669. 
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of employment discrimination. 22 A plaintiff can establish a prima 
facie case by showing discrimination through either disparate treat-
ment or disparate impact. 23 
1. Disparate Treatment Theory 
Discrimination by disparate treatment occurs when some people 
are treated less favorably by their employer because of their race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.24 To establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination under the disparate treatment theory, a plain-
tiff must offer proof of discriminatory motive. 25 In disparate treat-
ment cases, the requisite intent to discriminate is established by the 
employer's act of classifying employees on a prohibited basis. 26 
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate treat-
ment, the burden shifts to the employer to establish a defense to 
the discriminatory allegations.27 The BFOQ defense is the only sta-
tutory defense available for a disparate treatment claim. 28 The BFOQ 
exception allows an employer to classify employees on the basis of 
sex legally where sex is "reasonably necessary to the normal oper-
ation of that particular business. "29 In sex discrimination cases, 
courts traditionally have construed the BFOQ exception narrowly. 30 
22 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361, 368 (4th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). 
23 See Burwell, 633 F.2d at 369. 
24 [d.; see, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (smaller payment 
to women than men under retirement plan); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (female employees required to make larger monthly contribution 
to retirement, disability, and death-benefit programs than male employees). 
25 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4583, 4584 (U.S. June 6, 1989); 
Burwell, 633 F.2d at 369; Williams, supra note 5, at 669. 
26 Williams, supra note 5, at 669 n.176. 
The requisite intent is more difficult to establish when the plaintiff claims that a neutral 
characteristic is a mere pretext to discriminate. See id. If the requisite intent is established, 
then the pretext case is treated as a disparate treatment case. If, however, intent is not 
shown, then the pretext case is treated as a disparate impact case. See infra notes 41-51 and 
accompanying text. 
27 Burwell, 633 F.2d at 368; Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1984). 
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). 
29 [d. The statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) clarifies that clear disparate treat-
ment sex discrimination cases will be tested by the BFOQ defense. See Burwell, 633 F.2d at 
370; Levin, 730 F.2d at 997. 
30 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (Court persuaded by restrictive 
language of Title VII's legislative history that Congress intended the BFOQ exception to be 
a very narrow exception to Title VII's antidiscrimination principle); see also Weeks v. Southern 
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (1969) (court concluded that, if the BFOQ exception 
were to be interpreted broadly, the exception would swallow the rule). One commentator has 
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The only apparent expansion of the BFOQ exception has occurred 
in the context of the transportation industry where the safety of 
third parties has been at risk. 31 For example, courts have upheld 
policies that require the layoff of pregnant airline stewardesses at a 
certain point in their pregnancy on the basis that passenger safety 
is at risk. 32 Although a safety exception appears to be an expansion 
of the traditional BFOQ, the safety of third parties is only jeopar-
dized because pregnancy interferes with a stewardess's ability to 
perform adequately all the duties of her job in the event of an 
emergency. 33 
Similarly, the requirement that only men are eligible for correc-
tional counselor positions in a male maximum-security penitentiary 
has been held to be an example of a legitimate BFOQ.34 A female 
correctional officer poses a potential security problem because of her 
sex. 35 Maintaining security at the penitentiary is the essence of a 
correctional counselor's responsibilities, and therefore, being female 
interferes with a counselor's ability to do the job.36 
The BFOQ defense has been interpreted in various ways,37 but in 
essence it maintains Title VII's prohibition against employers refus-
ing employment to a woman or a man based on stereotyped char-
acterizations of the sexes. 38 Stereotyped characterizations will not 
meet the standard for a BFOQ defense whether they are real or 
fictional because Title VII focuses on the individual. 39 
stated that the courts' interpretation of BFOQ has been consistent with language of the BFOQ 
provision by requiring some relation to ability to do the job. See Becker, supra note 1, at 
1251-53. 
31 See Becker, supra note 1, at 1252-53. 
32 See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361, 371 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
450 U.S. 965 (1981); Gardner v. National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249, 263 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
33 See Becker, supra note 1, at 1253. 
34 See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336--37. 
35 Id. at 336. In Alabama penetentiaries aggressive inmates live in dormitories instead of 
single-cell lockups. Id. In such a situation where some of the inmates have been convicted of 
sex crimes, there is a likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because she was a 
woman.Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385,388 (5th Cir. 1971) (the BFOQ 
defense is valid in sex discrimination cases only when hiring members of both sexes, instead 
of members of one sex exclusively, would undermine the essence of the business), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,235 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(BFOQ defense valid where there is a factual basis for believing that substantially all women 
would be unable to perform the duties of their job safely and efficiently). 
38 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); see also City of Los Angeles Dep't 
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978). 
39 See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708. If a stereotype is fictional, then the reason is obvious for 
its failure to meet the BFOQ standard. The rationale for denying real stereotypes as well is 
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In sum, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of sex discrim-
ination under a disparate treatment theory by showing that the 
employer is classifying employees on the basis of sex or by showing 
that the employer, while classifying employees on the basis of a 
neutral characteristic, intends to discriminate against either males 
or females. 40 The burden then shifts to the employer, whose only 
defense is the BFOQ. Even if discriminatory motive cannot be 
shown, the plaintiff may still be able to establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination under the disparate impact theory. 
2. Disparate Impact Theory 
Discrimination by disparate impact, unlike discrimination by dis-
parate treatment, involves employment practices that are facially 
neutral, but that have a disproportionate impact upon a protected 
group. 41 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under a 
disparate impact theory, a plaintiff need not show that an employer 
had a discriminatory intent.42 Instead, a plaintiff need show only 
that the employment practice in question has a disparate impact 
upon a protected class. Disparate impact can be established by the 
use of statistical data, showing that a protected group is dispropor-
tionately affected by the employer's actions. 43 Title VII requires, 
based on the statutory language of Title VII, which prohibits invidious discrimination. The 
individual must be distinguished from the class as a whole. The extent to which an individual 
mayor may not possess that particular stereotypical characteristic is irrelevant in applying 
Title VII's antidiscrimination principle. See id. at 707-08. 
40 In contrast to disparate impact theory, disparate treatment requires a prima facie case 
of sex discrimination based on the requisite showing of discriminatory intent to prove disparate 
treatment from a neutral classification. Such disparate treatment is often referred to as 
"pretext discrimination." See Williams, supra note 5, at 669. 
41 See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361, 369 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 965 (1981). 
The Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), held that Title VII not 
only proscribed overt discrimination, but also proscribed facially neutral employment practices 
that have a discriminatory impact upon a protected class. The Court justified this expansion 
by reference to the purpose of Title VII, which is the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on 
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." I d. 
42 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4583, 4584 (U.S. June 6, 1989); 
Burwell, 633 F.2d at 369. Title VII is directed at the consequences of certain employment 
procedures. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. It is designed to prevent invidious discriminatory results, 
not simply the motivation of the employer. Id. Consequently, the employer's motive is irrel-
evant unless it constitutes an acceptable justification for a particular employment practice. 
See id. 
43 See generally B.L. SCRLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1331-
1389 (2d ed. 1983); Wards Cove Packing, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4585-87. 
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however, more than a mere showing of a statistical imbalance to 
make out a prima facie case of disparate impact. 44 The plaintiff must 
show causation by demonstrating that the application of a particular 
employment practice created the disparate impact. 45 
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact, 
the burden shifts to the employer to assert a defense. 46 The typical 
defense in disparate impact cases is the "business necessity" de-
fense. 47 This defense, unlike the statutorily created BFOQ defense, 
has been developed judicially.48 The defense recognizes that employ-
ers may be justified, under certain circumstances, in maintaining an 
employment practice despite its differential impact upon a protected 
class. 49 To assert the business necessity defense effectively, an em-
ployer must meet a two-pronged test. First, an employer must 
produce evidence that the particular employment practice serves 
legitimate employment goals significantly. 50 Second, there cannot be 
a less discriminatory alternative that would serve the same business 
purpose that the current practice purports to fulfill. 51 
In sum, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate 
impact discrimination by showing that a particular employment prac-
tice causes a harsher effect on a protected class than it does on other 
classes. The burden then shifts to the employer to establish a busi-
ness necessity defense. To rebut the discriminatory allegations suc-
cessfully, the employer must show that the employment practice not 
only serves legitimate employment goals successfully, but also is the 
least discriminatory alternative available to satisfy that goal. 
The characterization of a particular employment policy under the 
alternative discrimination theories can be critical to the viability or 
demise of that policy. If a disparate treatment characterization is 
recognized, the employer can invoke only the very narrow BFOQ 
defense, which is more difficult to establish than the business neces-
sity defense. 52 Alternatively, if a disparate impact characterization 
44 Wards Cove Packing, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4587. 
45Id. 
46 Burwell, 633 F.2d at 368; Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1984). 
47 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 
1006 (1971); see also Burwell, 633 F.2d at 369. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971). 
4ll Williams, supra note 5, at 671. 
49 Robinson, 444 F.2d at 797. 
50 Wards Cove Packing, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4588. To fulfill the first prong of the test an employer 
need not show that the particular employment practice is essential or indispensible to the 
business, but must show more than an insubstantial justification. Id. 
51 See id.; Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798. 
52 See Williams, supra note 5, at 670-72. The BFOQ only allows class-based exclusions when 
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is recognized, the employer has the broader, more flexible defense 
of business necessity at his or her disposal. 
Prior to 1978, judicial characterizations of pregnancy-based clas-
sifications swung from the disparate treatment pole to the disparate 
impact pole. Consequently, Congress passed the PDA 53 to settle the 
status of pregnancy-based classifications. 
B. Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
During the 1970s, United States Courts of Appeals decisions re-
garding pregnancy classifications accepted pregnancy as a sex-based 
classification. 54 The Supreme Court, however, disregarded that 
trend. In General Electric v. Gilbert,55 the plaintiff challenged the 
validity of a disability insurance plan that paid benefits to employees 
disabled as a result of nonoccupational sickness or accident. 56 The 
company routinely denied disability-benefit claims for absences due 
to pregnancy, claiming that the plan did not cover pregnancy-related 
disabilities. 57 The plaintiffs alleged that, because the company re-
fused to pay women disability-benefits for pregnancy-related ab-
sences, the policy impermissibly discriminated on the basis of sex. 58 
The Court held that classification by pregnancy is not sex-based 
discrimination, and, therefore, does not by itself establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination under a disparate treatment theory. 59 
The General Electric Court relied heavily on Geduldig v. Aiello60 
in reaching its decision. The plaintiff in Geduldig challenged a dis-
ability plan identical to the one upheld in General Electric because 
such exclusions are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business. 
[d. at 670-71. In contrast, the business necessity defense justifies employment policies when 
they are the only effective way to meet central business concerns. [d. at 672. 
53 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). 
54 See, e.g., Communication Workers of Am. v. AT&T, 513 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1975), 
vacated, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Gilbert v. General Elec., 519 F.2d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 1975), 
cen. granted, 423 U.S. 822 (1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 
F.2d 850, 854-55 (6th Cir. 1975), cen. granted, 429 U.S. 1071 (1977), modified, 434 U.S. 136 
(1977); Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1975), cen. 
granted, 429 U.S. 1071 (1977), vacated, 434 U.S. 158 (1977). 
55429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
56 See id. at 128. 
57 [d. at 129. 
58 [d. 
59 [d. at 136--37, 145-46. The Court considered pregnancy to be a neutral classification and 
stated that, to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the plaintiff had to show a 
gender-based effect resulting from the disability plan. See id. at 137. 
60 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
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it also excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage. 61 The 
Geduldig case, however, was brought under the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, rather than Title VII. 62 The 
Geduldig Court held that the plan did not violate the equal protection 
clause because it did not discriminate against any defined group in 
terms of its overall protection. 63 The Court reasoned that there was 
no risk from which men were protected and women were not, or 
vice versa. 64 
General Electric relied on Geduldig's finding that exclusion of 
pregnancy-related disabilities did not discriminate against any gen-
der, and appiied this rationale to Title VII.65 The Court stated that 
exclusion of pregnancy from coverage under the disability plan was 
not sex-based, implying that a prima facie case of discrimination by 
disparate treatment was not established. 66 The Court in General 
Electric delineated the position of the federal judiciary: for the pur-
pose of Title VII, pregnancy classification is not sex-based discrim-
ination. 67 
The General Electric decision provided impetus for the PDA.68 
The PDA made Congress's dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of sex-based discrimination under Title VII69 crystal 
clear.70 The PDA states that the word "sex" in Title VII includes, 
but is not limited to, pregnancy, child-birth, or related medical con-
ditions. 71 The effect of the PDA on Title VII analysis is that any 
classification based on pregnancy, child-birth, or related medical 
conditions is discrimination on the basis of sex and constitutes a per 
se violation of Title VII.72 
Thus, Title VII analysis in a sex discrimination case begins by 
determining if an employer's policy is based on a classification pro-
61 [d. at 486. 
62 See id. at 487. 
63 See id. at 496. 
64 [d. at 496-97. 
65 General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976). 
66 See id. at 136. 
67 See id. at 145-46. The General Electric decision had a major impact upon the circuit 
courts, prompting requests for certiorari and vacations. See Gardner v. National Airlines, 434 
F. Supp. 249, 256 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). Subsection (k) clarifies the meaning of the term "sex" within 
sectio!1 2000e-2(a). [d. 
7142 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). 
72 See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm'n, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983). 
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hibited by the PDA.73 If a policy is grounded in a prohibited classi-
fication, then a clear case of sex discrimination by disparate treat-
ment exists. 74 The only available defense to an employer is the BFOQ 
defens8. 75 
Title VII protects workers by protecting employment opportuni-
ties from unjustifiable discriminatory practices. The OSH Act76 also 
protects workers. Whereas Title VII attempts to guarantee access 
to the workplace, the OSH Act attempts to guarantee that the 
workplace is a safe place in which to work. 
C. aSH Act Standards 
The primary objective of the OSH Act is to make the workplace 
safe for all employees. 77 The general duty clause of the OSH Act78 
requires employers to furnish a workplace that is free from recog-
nized hazards that cause or are likely to cause death or serious 
injury.79 Thus, the OSH Act places the burden of providing a safe 
workplace on employers. 80 
Furthermore, the OSH Act encourages employers to abate haz-
ards before taking action that may be detrimental to employees. 81 
Courts have not yet decided, however, whether employers may 
comply with the OSH Act by excluding employees rather than im-
plementing steps to abate a hazard in order to save time and money. 82 
Congress's use of the language "to the extent feasible" in the OSH 
73 See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text. 
74 See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text. 
75 See id. 
76 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
77 See id. § 654(a)(1). For a more complete discussion of the OSH Act, see generally Drapkin, 
OSHA's General Duty Clause: Its Use is Not Abuse-A Response to Morgan and Duvall, 5 
INDUS. REL. L.J. 322 (1983); MacCarthy, A Review of Some Normative and Conceptual 
Issues in Occupational Safety and Health, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 773 (1981); Postell, 
Teaching Employees About Workplace Hazards, 24 TRIAL 86 (1988); Rothstein, Substantive 
and Procedural Obstacles to OSHA Rulemaking: Reproductive Hazards as an Example, 12 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627 (1985); Viscusi, The Structure and Enforcement of Job Safety 
Regulation, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1986); Note, Avoiding the Use of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in the Context of Occupational Safety and Health; The Requirement of Significant 
Risk; Industrial Union Development AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 22 B.C.L. 
REV. 1149 (1981). 
78 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982). 
79Id. 
80 See Ashford & Caldart, The Control of Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace: A 
Prescription for Prevention, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 523, 530 (1983). 
81Id. 
82 Id. at 533-34. 
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Act's standard-setting provision83 implies that Congress did not ig-
nore the enormous financial cost associated with the abatement of 
workplace hazards. 84 Feasibility is limited, for example, when the 
costs of compliance threaten the viability of an entire industry. 85 
Nevertheless, feasibility for the purposes of the OSH Act is defined 
as "capable of being done,"86 and the substantial costs associated 
with compliance are often viewed as a cost of doing business.87 
Despite the OSH Act's emphasis on feasible abatement and Title 
VII's antidiscrimination principle, employers have instituted fetal 
protection policies in response to reproductive hazards in the work-
place. Employers justify such policies on a moral responsibility for 
protecting health and as insurance against tort liability. 
III. EMPLOYER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FETAL PROTECTION 
POLICIES 
Employers proffer two reasons for the institution of fetal protec-
tion policies. First, employers state that they have a moral obliga-
tion, as does society, to protect the health of the next generation. 88 
Second, employers are concerned that reproductive hazards will 
expose them to extensive tort liability.89 Neither of these reasons is 
unfounded. 
Society's interest in protecting health is reflected in the numerous 
national laws that impose restrictions and obligations upon business 
enterprises. 90 Examples of these laws include the Consumer Product 
Safety Act,91 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,92 and the 
OSH Act. 93 
Employers' fear of future tort liability arising from exposure to 
workplace hazards is equally legitimate. Generally, workers' com-' 
pensation provides relief for loss resulting from injury, disablement, 
83 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982). 
84 See Brodin, supra note 10, at 363-64. 
85 See id. at 363. Although the intent of Congress in drafting the OSH Act was to protect 
workers, such protection was not meant to put employers out of business. Industrial Union 
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
86 See id. at 363. 
87 Id. at 364. 
88 Williams, supra note 5, at 644. 
89 See id.; see also We Only Want What's Best For You, STUDENT LAW., Nov. 1988, at 4, 
4-5 (1988). 
90 See Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 n.26 (4th Cir. 1982). 
91 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
92 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
93 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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or death of workers resulting from industrial·accident, casualty, or 
disease. 94 In order to obtain such relief, however, an employee must 
show that an employment contract existed at the time of injury to 
warrant compensation. 95 Furthermore, workers' compensation op-
erates as an exclusive remedy precluding all other remedies and 
liabilities, including a tort cause of action. 96 
Despite the breadth of workers' compensation coverage, it has not 
been extended to children who suffer prenatal injuries resulting from 
reproductive hazards in the workplace because "employees" has not 
been construed to include unborn children. 97 Consequently, children 
who suffer such prenatal injuries may sue the employer in tort for 
limitless money. Moreover, even if a female employee risked the 
exposure to a reproductive hazard and sought workers' compensa-
tion, she could not forfeit the tort cause of action that accrues to the 
child. 98 Employers are therefore exposed to a potentially tremendous 
financial burden. 
Title VII also exposes employers financially because courts hear-
ing Title VII cases have not historically accepted a cost-based de-
fense as valid. Although recently a cost-defense has been creeping 
into Title VII litigation, its emergence has occurred only where 
economic risks, and not human risks, are at stake. 99 Courts exam-
ining the legality of fetal protection policies have held that a desire 
to avoid tort liability cannot stand alone as a defense against alle-
gations of discrimination. 100 
Despite the invalidity of cost-based defenses, courts have been 
willing to uphold the legitimacy of fetal protection policies based on 
the proper criteria. 101 Courts have held that the societal interest in 
protecting unborn children may legitimate an otherwise illegitimate 
94 81 AM. JUR. 2D Workmen's Compensation § 1 (1976). 
95Id. § 153. 
96 Id. § 50. 
97 See Sloan, Employer's Tort Liability When a Female Employee is Exposed to Harmful 
Substances, 3 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 506,511 (1978). 
98 See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 40 (1987), cited in Finneran, Title VII and 
Restrictions on Employment of Fertile Women, 31 LAB. L.J. 223, 229 n.36 (1980). 
99 See Brodin, supra note 10, at 353. For a detailed discussion of the cost-defense to Title 
VII allegations, see id. at 344-65. 
100 See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 n.26 (4th Cir. 1982). 
101 See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (although court 
invalidated hospital's fetal protection policy, it upheld legitimacy of fetal protection policies in 
general, and further refined framework established by other courts); Wright v. Olin Corp., 
697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) (court remanded case to be decided consistent with disparate 
impact framework established by the court for examining fetal protection policies). 
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cost-based defense. 102 Thus, employers and courts together have 
subordinated society's interest in protecting human health and well-
being to profit-maximization. 103 Courts have encouraged this trend 
by subjecting fetal protection policies to relaxed scrutiny. 104 
With one exception,105 these fetal protection cases have been 
brought under Title VII instead of the OSH Act. The circuit courts 
that have applied Title VII to fetal protection policies have not 
followed the disparate treatment/BFOQ analysis, but instead have 
allowed employers to assert a business necessity defense previously 
reserved for disparate impact cases. 106 This loosening of traditional 
Title VII analysis has left the door open for the implementation of 
discriminatory fetal protection policies. 
IV. ApPLICATION OF TITLE VII To FETAL PROTECTION POLICIES 
Wright v. Olin Corp. 107 and Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospita[l08 
form the foundation of current Title VII analysis. 109 Facially, the 
means by which each court circumvented the proper use of disparate 
treatment analysis appear to be quite different. The apparent dif-
ferences, however, result merely from using different labels to de-
scribe essentially similar approaches. 
In fact, these two Title VII approaches are consistent in at least 
two respects. Both approaches permit the employer to raise the 
business necessity defense where normally only the BFOQ defense 
is available. uo Also, the proof required under each approach to jus-
tify exclusion of pregnant and fertile women is identical. III 
The policy challenged in Wright categorized reproductively haz-
ardous jobs into three groups: (1) restricted jobs, which excluded 
102 See Wright, 697 F.2d at 1189-90. 
103 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. 
104 See infra notes 107-55 and accompanying text. 
105 See Oil, Chern. & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (case tried under the OSH Act to determine if sterilization as a condition for employment 
is a "hazard" within the general duty clause of the OSH Act). 
106 See infra notes 107-55 and accompanying text. 
107 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). 
108 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984). 
109 Even though it involves a fetal protection policy, Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 
F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982), is irrelevant to this Comment. All the events in question occurred 
before 1978 and the advent of the PDA. Id. at 989 n.6. Thus, the use of a disparate impact 
theory was proper. Nevertheless, Zuniga's fetal protection policy, which terminated employ-
ment of a female x-ray technician when she became pregnant, was held to be invalid because 
it was not the least discriminatory policy. See id. at 994. 
110 See EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 2, at 4. 
111 See id. 
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fertile women because of the exposure to "known or suspected abor-
tifacient or teratogenic agents;"ll2 (2) controlled jobs presenting lim-
ited exposure to harmful chemicals, which allowed pregnant women 
to work only after an individual evaluation because of limited expo-
sure to harmful chemicals;113 and (3) unrestricted jobs, which posed 
no reproductive hazards and which women were fully eligible to 
perform.114 The Fourth Circuit analyzed this fetal protection policy 
under the disparate impactlbusiness necessity theory.115 The court 
chose the disparate impact theory over the disparate treatment 
theory because proper application of the disparate treatment theory 
would have limited the employer to the narrow BFOQ defense. 116 
The court implied that such a result was undesirable in the fetal 
protection area. 117 
The Fourth Circuit, however, failed to address whether, in light 
of the PDA, the challenged fetal protection policy should have been 
considered discriminatory on its face and judged according to the 
disparate treatmentlBFOQ standard. The court focused instead on 
the notion that Title VII theories admit of no bright lines in their 
application. 118 Because different theories may force a court to choose 
among them, the Wright court determined that general principles 
developed in Title VII litigation should guide the decision-making 
process. 119 The court thus based its selection of the disparate impact 
theory on certain principles underlying the development of Title 
VII. 120 
The Wright decision relied on Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty121 and 
its interpretation of Title VII principles. Nashville Gas involved a 
mandatory pregnancy leave policy that denied sick pay, erased all 
accumulated job seniority, and did not guarantee job reinstate-
ment. 122 The Supreme Court applied the disparate impactlbusiness 
112 Wright v. Olin, 697 F.2d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1982). 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. at 1185. 
116 See id. at 1185 n.21. 
117 See id. 
m See id. at 1184-85. 
119 See id. at 1185. 
120 See id. The development of Title VII has focused on consequences of employment policies 
rather than their "neutral" expression. See id. at 1186. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Court expanded Title VII coverage to neutral classifications having 
a disparate impact upon a protected class and created the business necessity defense to 
accompany expansion). 
121 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
122 See id. at 137. 
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necessity theory and did not uphold the policy because the employer 
failed to prove a business necessity for the policy.123 The Court 
determined, by negative inference, that a prima facie case of dis-
crimination had been established under Title VII.124 The Court rea-
soned that, although Title VII does not require an employer to give 
a woman economic benefits, it does not permit an employer to de-
prive her of employment opportunities because of her biological role 
in life. 125 
The Nashville Gas Court distinguished the case at bar from Gen-
eral Electric v. Gilbert,126 in which the Court upheld the denial of 
pregnancy-related disability. benefits.127 The Court stated that the 
policy in General Electric, unlike the one in Nashville Gas, did not 
impose a substantial burden on women. 128 The policy in General 
Electric merely denied women benefits. 129 In Nashville Gas, how-
ever, the Court invalidated the employer's policy because the em-
ployer failed to justify imposing a burden on women. 130 
The Wright court determined that the consequences of the com-
pany's policy were similar to the consequences of the policy struck 
down in Nashville Gas, in that both policies imposed a substantial 
burden upon women and not upon men. 131 The court concluded from 
this similarity that the business necessity test applied in Nashville 
Gas was applicable in Wright. 132 
The court elaborated upon the substantive showing that an em-
ployer must make to establish the business necessity defense. 133 At 
the outset, an employer must prove that a substantial risk of harm 
to unborn children is posed by maternal exposure to toxic environ-
ments in the workplace. 134 An employer's policy must effectuate its 
purpose of fetal protection by only restricting females and not 
males. 135 Additionally, the scientific evidence used to support the 
policy must be independent, objective, and supported by expert 
123 See id. at 143. 
124 See id. at 142. 
125 See id. 
126 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text. 
127 See Nashville Gas, 434 U.S. at 141-42. 
128 See id. at 142. 
1291d. 
130 See id. at 141-42. 
131 See Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1186 (4th Cir. 1982). 
1321d. 
133 See id. at 1190. 
134 See id. 
1351d. 
1989] FETAL PROTECTION 217 
opinions in the field. 136 This prima facie defense, however, is rebutt-
able if the plaintiff shows that there are less discriminatory ways to 
effectuate the same goals. 137 
By allowing a disparate treatment case of sex discrimination to be 
justified by a business necessity defense, the Wright court excepted 
fetal protection policies from the traditional Title VII framework. 
The Wright court thus has paved the way for other courts to uphold 
fetal protection policies by giving the employer a defense where no 
viable one exists under Title VII. 
In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital,138 for example, the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the Wright court's lead and 
allowed the employer to use a defense where none had previously 
existed. 139 Hayes involved an x-ray technician who was fired when 
she informed her supervisor that she was pregnant. 140 The court did 
not uphold the fetal protection policy challenged by the technician, 
however, because the employer-hospital could not establish a busi-
ness necessity defense. 141 The hospital failed to show a substantial 
risk of harm to the pregnant technician from the amount of radiation 
exposure in her workplace. 142 Moreover, even if the hospital had 
established a business necessity defense, the policy would not have 
been upheld because it was not the least discriminatory method to 
ensure against fetal harm. 143 
In determining the Title VII framework under which to analyze 
the facts, the Hayes court began with the proposition that any 
classification based on pregnancy or related conditions can never be 
considered neutral under the PDA.144 Although the Hayes court 
stated that the case involved a facially discriminatory policy,145 it 
proceeded to develop a Title VII framework inconsistent with tra-
ditional disparate treatment analysis. 146 Rather than test the policy 
in terms of a BFOQ defense, the court applied a business necessity 
test. 147 
136 [d. 
137 [d. at 1191. 
138 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984). 
139 See id. at 1548 n.8. 
140 [d. at 1546. 
141 See id. at 1550. 
142 [d. 
143 See id. at 1553-54. 
144 [d. at 1547. 
145 [d. at 1548. 
146 See id. at 1548-49. 
147 See id. at 1552. 
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The Hayes analysis began by presuming that any employment 
policy that applies only to women or pregnant women is, by its 
terms, facially discriminatory.148 The court found that this presump-
tion, however, is rebuttable if the employer can show that the policy 
effectively and equally protects the offspring of all employees. 149 The 
employer must satisfy a two-part test to rebut the presumption of 
facial discrimination. First, the employer must show that there is a 
substantial risk of harm to the unborn children of female employees 
from the women's exposure to toxic hazards in the workplace, either 
during pregnancy or while fertile. Second, the employer must dem-
onstrate that the reproductive hazard poses a risk only to fertile and 
pregnant women, but not to men. Moreover, the scientific evidence 
used to establish the rebuttal must be objectively supported by the 
opinions of experts in the relevant scientific fields. 150 
If the rebuttal is successful, the challenged policy is deemed neu-
tral. 151 Accordingly, the employee has a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.152 The employer's business necessity defense applies auto-
matically because the employer proved previously that its policy IS 
justified on a scientific basis and addresses a harm that only affects 
women and not men. 153 Even if an attempt at rebuttal is not suc-
cessful, however, according to the Hayes court a court may view the 
case as disparate treatment discrimination, giving the employer a 
second chance to defend the fetal protection policy. 154 The only avail-
able defense to the employer under those circumstances would be 
the BFOQ defense. 155 
Notwithstanding the difference in language, the analytical frame-
works of Wright and Hayes are identical. Under each the plaintiff 
asserts a Title VII allegation of sex discrimination, and the employer 
then asserts the objective scientific evidence proving substantial risk 
of harm to the offspring through maternal exposure. The plaintiff 
then suggests less discriminatory alternatives to reach the same 
safety objective, and, if successful, the policy is invalidated. If the 
plaintiff is unsuccessful, the policy remains intact. The only factor 
148Id. at 1548. 
149Id. 
150 Id. 
151 I d. at 1552. 
152Id. 
153 Id. at 1553. Similar to any disparate impact case, the plaintiff may still defeat the policy 
by showing that it is not the least discriminatory alternative. Id. 
154 Id. at 1549. 
155Id. 
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distinguishing Hayes from Wright is that the Hayes court acknowl-
edged the existence of the PDA and the fact that pregnancy-based 
policies are facially discriminatory. Nonetheless, Hayes strips this 
acknowledgement of all significance by allowing the employer to 
justify fetal protection with a business necessity defense. 
V. THE QUESTIONABLE VALIDITY OF FETAL PROTECTION 
POLICIES 
A. Title VII Precedent Defied 
The courts' great concern for the potential harm to employees' 
offspring has generated innovative interpretations of Title VII. 
These interpretations utilize the disparate impact theory to mitigate 
the harsh results that would follow from proper application of dis-
parate treatment analysis. Under proper Title VII analysis, an em-
ployer has no real viable defense to uphold such a policy. Conse-
quently, the courts have rubber-stamped the validity of fetal 
protection policies by defying Title VII precedent. 
Title VII precedent dictates the use of the BFOQ defense for 
disparate treatment cases of sex discrimination. 156 Both Wright and 
Hayes, however, allowed the employer to assert a business necessity 
defense. 157 
The Wright court relied on Nashville Gas in its decision to provide 
the employer with a business necessity defense. 158 Reliance upon 
Nashville Gas, however, is misguided; Nashville Gas was decided 
in 1977, a year before Congress enacted the PDA.159 Prior to the 
PDA, a classification based on pregnancy was considered neutral, 
and thus was analyzed under a disparate impactlbusiness necessity 
theory.160 Wright, however, was decided in 1982, after passage of 
the PDA.161 Consequently, the Wright decision, through its reliance 
156 See supra notes 24--39 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra notes 107-55 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra notes 121--32 and accompanying text. 
159 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty was decided in 1977. See 434 U.S. 136 (1977). The effective 
date of the PDA was October 31, 1978. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). 
160 See supra notes 41-72 and accompanying text. 
161 Although Wright was decided in December 1982, the court does not mention whether 
the case falls under the PDA. In fact, the case makes no mention of the PDA whatsoever. 
Apparently, the policy challenged in Wright was adopted in 1978. See Wright v. Olin Corp., 
697 F.2d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1982); Becker, supra note 1, at 1227. Thus, it is probable that 
the case should have been decided in light of the PDA. Moreover, it is imperative to view this 
decision in light of the PDA because of its substantial contribution to the developing law in 
the area of fetal protection, which is clearly governed by the PDA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(1982). 
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on inapposite precedent,162 excepts fetal protection policies from the 
established Title VII analytical framework for disparate treatment 
sex discrimination. 163 
Not only did the Wright court disregard traditional Title VII 
principles in its choice of a theory, but it also proceeded to fit the 
facts at hand into an established variation of the business necessity 
defense, namely, the safety of third parties. l64 Such a defense is 
available when a third person is an invitee and the plaintiff-employ-
ee's condition inhibits his or her performance of all the duties nec-
essary to ensure the safety of that invitee. 165 By categorizing the 
employees' unborn children as invitees,166 the Wright court entitled 
unborn children to the same duty of care as invitees. 167 Consequently, 
the court concluded that if customer safety is a valid business ne-
cessity defense, then the protection of unborn children is a valid 
justification as well. 168 
The Wright court ignored the contradictory dicta, however, in the 
two primary cases it relied upon to reach its conclusion. Despite the 
clear rejection in Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines169 and Gardner v. 
National Airlines170 of the protection of unborn children as a valid 
Title VII defense, the Wright court deemed such protection a legit-
imate business necessity defense against challenges to fetal protec-
tion policies. 171 Burwell involved a mandatory maternity leave policy 
for flight attendants, effective upon knowledge of pregnancy. 172 
Flight attendants were deprived of seniority while on maternity 
leave. 173 The plaintiffs alleged that this policy discriminated on the 
basis of sex.174 The employer argued that the policy was justified 
because pregnant flight attendants could jeopardize the safety of the 
162 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
163 See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 965 (1981). 
164 See Wright, 697 F.2d at 1189. The cases allowing the safety of third parties as a valid 
defense have involved primarily the transportation industries. See, e.g., Burwell, 633 F.2d 
361; Gardner v. National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249, 263 (S.D. Fla. 1977); see also supra notes 
31-33 and accompanying text. 
165 See, e.g., Burwell, 633 F.2d 361; Gardner, 434 F. Supp. 263. 
166 Wright, 697 F.2d at 1189. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. 
169 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). 
170 434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
171 Wright, 697 F.2d at 1189-90. 
172 Burwell, 633 F.2d at 365. 
173Id. at 364. 
174 Id. at 365. 
1989] FETAL PROTECTION 221 
passengers, and that the health of pregnant flight attendants and 
their unborn children was at risk. 175 The court held that the man-
datory maternity leave policy was justified on the basis of ensuring 
the safety of passengers, but only after the thirteenth week of 
pregnancy.176 The court refused to accept concerns for the safety of 
pregnant employees and their unborn children as a legitimate de-
fense, stating that, in the area of civil rights, individuals should 
make the decisions regarding personal risks so long as those risks 
do not affect business operations. 177 
Similarly, the court in Gardner found that neither the courts nor 
the employer should make personal risk decisions for employees. 178 
Gardner involved a mandatory unpaid pregnancy leave for flight 
attendants effective upon knowledge of pregnancy.179 Additionally, 
the policy required pregnant flight attendants to notify the company 
in writing of pregnancy and to return to work within sixty days of 
giving birth. 180 Furthermore, if a pregnant flight attendant failed to 
comply with these requirements, the company could permanently 
terminate her employment. 181 The court held that passenger safety 
was jeopardized by the pregnant flight attendant's inability to per-
form properly all duties after the twentieth week of pregnancy, and 
thus justified operation of the mandatory pregnancy leave policy 
after the twentieth week. 182 Like the Burwell court, the court re-
fused to justify the policy by reference to the potential danger to 
the fetus, stating that such a decision should be made by the mother 
and not the court.183 The Wright court's reliance on Burwell and 
Gardner for policies based only on fetal protection is thus flawed. 
Because of this reliance, the Wright court's choice of disparate 
impact theory to the use of the business necessity defense is also 
inappropriate. Unfortunately, the court in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial 
Hospita[184 followed Wright's mandate to distort Title VII principles 
when applied to fetal protection cases. The court in Hayes uncon-
vincingly disguised its analysis as something other than disparate 
175Id. 
176 See id. at 371. 
177Id. 
178 Gardner v. National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249, 259 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
179Id. at 254. 
18°Id. 
181Id. 
182 See id. at 263. 
183 I d. at 259. 
184 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984). 
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impact.185 By setting up a rebuttable presumption of facial discrim-
ination, a court taking the Hayes approach actually allows an em-
ployer to assert a business necessity defense from the start, just as 
in disparate impact cases. 186 A failure to rebut the presumption in 
effect implies that the business necessity reason proffered is not 
acceptable and that the policy should not be upheld. 
The Hayes approach insulates an employer from disparate treat-
mentlBFOQ analysis. Only if the rebuttal of facial discrimination 
fails does a court analyze under a disparate treatment test. Unlike 
under a disparate impact test, it is improbable that pregnancy or 
fertility under circumstances that prompt fetal protection policies 
would ever meet the job-related standard of the BFOQ defense. 187 
Moreover, if the employer cannot satisfy the broader business ne-
cessity defense, it is a safe assumption that the narrower BFOQ 
standard cannot be satisfied. 
Insulating fetal protection policies from the disparate treatment/ 
BFOQ analysis is incongruous with Title VII policy. Title VII policy 
is based on the removal of hindrances that are artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary to employment when these hindrances operate to 
discriminate invidiously against a protected class. 188 Fetal protection 
policies foster sex discrimination instead of inhibit it,189 and, there-
fore, fly in the face of Title VII's purpose. The innovative Title VII 
approaches to fetal protection policies employed in Wright and Hayes 
are difficult to rationalize in light of Title VII's intent, Supreme 
Court precedent, and the PDA. 
Despite this defiance of precedent, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) has adopted the lead of the Hayes 
and Wright courts.190 The EEOC views this choice as a balancing 
approach that protects women's employment opportunities from un-
necessary limitations, while protecting the health of the next gen-
eration. 191 This analytical approach, however, does not necessarily 
promote the health of future offspring, not to mention the health of 
male workers, due to the nature of reproductive hazards,192 judicial 
185 See supra notes 138-55 and accompanying text. 
186 See id. 
187 See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1549 n.9. 
188 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
189 See We Only Want What's Best For You, STUDENT LAW., Nov. 1988, at 4. 
190 See EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 2, at 4. 
191 Id. at 2. 
192 There are three general categories of reproductive hazards: fetal toxins, teratogens, and 
germ cell mutagens. Ashford & Caldart, supra note 80, at 524-25. Both fetal toxins and 
teratogens affect the fetus during pregnancy by passing through the placenta. Id. at 525. 
Teratogens additionally can alter the physiology of the mother, thereby affecting the fetus. 
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enforcement,193 and the lack of concrete scientific evidence. 194 Con-
sequently, this balancing approach fails to fulfill both its goals. 
Title VII's purpose is to ensure that women have the same em-
ployment opportunities as men and are not unduly denied employ-
ment. 195 Its success has largely been based on maintenance of the 
narrow BFOQ defense when facial discrimination is concerned. 196 
Wright, Hayes, and the EEOC Guidelines have undermined the 
success of Title VII by legitimizing fetal protection policies under a 
business necessity defense, when ordinarily the BFOQ defense 
would be applicable but would provide no safe harbor. Rubber-
stamping the validity of fetal protection policies not only defies Title 
VII precedent, but also affects women's fundamental right to privacy 
as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
B. Constitutional Right to Privacy Implications 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the existence of a right 
to privacy under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
[d. Fetal toxins and teratogens thus act to cause reproductive harm through maternal expo-
sure. In contrast, mutagens change the genetic structure of both male and female reproductive 
cells. [d. Reproductive hazards resulting from mutagens thus can occur through maternal or 
paternal exposure at any point during fertility. See id. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
hazardous substances are likely to have multiple effects, that is, carcinogenesis, mutagenesis, 
and teratogenesis. Williams, supra note 5, at 659. See generally McElveen, Reproductive 
Hazards in the Workplace, 20 FORUM 547 (1984). 
193 See, e.g., International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 
1988). The district court in Johnson Controls used the framework established by Wright and 
Hayes, but, in doing so, it misapplied the criteria set up under that framework. See id. at 
314-17. The Johnson Controls court should have at least scrutinized the scientific evidence 
under the Wright/Hayes test. See supra notes 133-37, 148-50 and accompanying text. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) submitted findings from extensive 
hearings and testimony that "[elxposure to lead has profoundly adverse effects on the course 
of reproduction in both males and females." ACL U Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Appel-
lants at 11, International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 88-1308 (7th Cir. argued Sept. 
15, 1988, reargued en banc June 1989). There was also evidence that lead exposure has 
nonreproductive effects as well. See id. at 12. Lead Industries Association (LIA) proposed 
that lead exposure only affected female reproduction and the defendant, Johnson Controls, 
Inc., relied on this evidence. See id. Despite conflicting evidence, see Johnson Controls, 680 
F. Supp. at 315, the court granted summary judgment for the defendant without further 
investigation whether women were appropriately restricted and not men. See id. at 318; 
American Public Health Association Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Appellants at 3, Inter-
national Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 88-1308 (7th Cir. argued Sept. 15, 1988, reargued 
en banc June 1989). 
194 Risk-evaluation regarding reproductive hazards is difficult because such evidence is 
largely inconclusive. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 2, at 7-8. This problem is compounded 
by the lack of studies focusing on paternal risks. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1236. Most 
studies have focused on maternal exposure, thereby leaving a gap in the evidence whether 
offspring health is endangered through paternal exposure as well. See id. at 1236--37. 
195 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
196 See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text. 
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ment. 197 The right to privacy includes the right to choose whether 
or not to conceive or to carry a child to term. 198 Although the right 
to make such a choice in privacy is constitutionally protected, it is 
not absolute. 199 The state can constitutionally interfere with a wom-
an's freedom of choice with respect to child-bearing only after a fetus 
becomes viable200 and only so long as the regulation or policy is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.201 
197 U.s. CONST. amend. XIV. 
Over the past thirty years, the United States Supreme Court has established the funda-
mental right to privacy for individuals even though it is not explicitly spelled out in the 
Constitution. See generally Carey v. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right of 
personal privacy, with right to procreate at the heart of the matter); Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (husband cannot interfere with wife's right to terminate preg-
nancy; parents cannot interfere with minor daughter's choice); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to choose to terminate her preg-
nancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to privacy for the individual); Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to privacy in marital relationship); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy and contraception). 
Courts have held that a state government's interference with an individual's right to privacy 
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood 
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (husband cannot interfere with a woman's decision to terminate 
pregnancy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (fourteenth amendment is broad enough 
to allow a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 190 
(1973) (cannot require a woman to carry a pregnancy to term); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965) (cannot forbid use of contraceptives). Thus, the fourteenth amendment protects 
the interest in making important decisions regarding matters of marriage, procreation, con-
traception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 
599-600 (1977). These cases demonstrate the limitations placed on state intrusion into private 
conduct. See id. at 600 n.26. 
198 Carey, 431 U.S. at 685. 
199 See Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the constitutionality of a state criminal abortion 
statute was challenged. [d. at 116. The statute made it a criminal act to have an abortion, 
except under medical advice to save the life of the mother. [d. at 117-18. The Supreme Court 
held that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting potential life, but this interest was 
not compelling until the point of viability. [d. at 163. 
The Supreme Court recently examined a Missouri statute restricting abortions in Webster 
v. Reproductive Health Services, 57 U.S.L.W. 5023 (U.S. June 27, 1989). The Court stated 
in dicta that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting potential human life before 
viability as well as after viability. [d. at 5030. Missouri legislators, however, chose viability 
as the point at which the state's interest in potential life must be protected. [d. at 5030-31. 
Thus, viability remains the point at which a state may constitutionally interfere with a woman's 
choice to obtain an abortion. 
200 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. Although the Court in Webster did not overrule Roe v. Wade, 57 
U.S.L.W. at 5031, it rejected the use of the rigid trimester framework established in Roe to 
determine viability of a fetus. See id. at 5030-31. The Supreme Court, instead, upheld the 
constitutionality of a testing requirement to determine viability, irrespective of the trimester, 
prior to performing an abortion. [d. at 5031. 
201 Roe, 410 U.S. at 165. A compelling state interest is analogous to Title VII's business 
necessity defense in that it justifies the interference into otherwise protected areas. See 
Gardner v. National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249, 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (court equated legitimate 
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Fetal protection policies infringe upon a woman's freedom of choice 
regarding procreation. These policies force women to choose be-
tween pregnancy, or even fertility,202 and employment.203 Fetal pro-
tection policies are analogous to the mandatory maternity leave 
policy struck down in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur. 204 
In LaFleur, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the 
Board of Education's rule requiring pregnant teachers to take an 
unpaid maternity leave starting with the fifth month of pregnancy. 205 
The rule did not guarantee reemployment after the birth of the 
child. 206 Failure to comply with any of the specific requirements of 
the rule was grounds for dismissal. 207 The Court held that the policy 
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because 
it seriously burdened the exercise of a constitutionally protected 
right. 208 
Similar to LaFleurs mandatory maternity leave policy, fetal pro-
tection policies burden the exercise of a constitutionally protected 
right. Fetal protection policies, however, impose a much more oner-
ous burden on women than LaFleurs policy because they penalize 
not only pregnant women, but also all women of child-bearing ca-
pacity.209 Employers have forced women to make choices regarding 
their procreative capacity as a condition to maintaining their em-
ployment status. 210 Moreover, in cases presenting a choice between 
fertility and sterility, employers have not only burdened women in 
the exercise of constitutionally protected choices, but have deprived 
them of any meaningful choice altogether.211 If a husband, who has 
governmental interest, with regard to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 
to the BFOQ defense, with regard to Title VII). 
202 See, e.g., Oil, Chern. & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (fetal protection policy adopted by employer "offer[edl continued employment ... 
to women who were surgically sterilized," and some women did in fact choose the sterilization 
option); see also International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 
1988); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1982). 
203 See, e.g., Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982); Hayes v. Shelby 
Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984). 
204 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
205 See id. at 634. 
206 [d. at 635. 
207 [d. 
20R [d. at 651. 
209 See, e.g., Oil, Chern. & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (five women underwent surgical sterilization after their employer informed them 
that all women would be excluded from reproductively hazardous jobs unless they presented 
proof of surgical sterilization). 
210 [d.; see also supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text. 
211 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (legislation requiring sterilization 
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a genuine interest in the potential life and health of the fetus, cannot 
interfere with a woman's choice in matters of procreation,212 then an 
employer certainly should not be granted this power. 
If the employer is a private employer, however, constitutional 
protection is not invoked. 213 Generally, the fourteenth amendment 
does not apply to actions between private individuals, but instead 
applies to governmental conduct that infringes upon protected 
rights.214 Although it has been held that state action includes any 
action officially taken by the courts or their judicial officers,215 it is 
unlikely that all private conduct will be subject to constitutional 
scrutiny merely because the plaintiff gets into court. 216 
Nonetheless, even though a private employer is involved, courts 
should not ignore privacy rights when dealing with private conduct. 
At least one court has followed this line of thinking in its rationale 
for invalidating a discriminatory employment policy.217 The court in 
Gardner considered the LaFleur court's decision relevant, even 
though LaFleur involved a public employer and was decided on due 
process grounds. Noting that LaFleurs decision under the due pro-
cess clause was a "distinction without a difference,"218 the Gardner 
court stated that LaFleur suggested the invalidity of any employ-
ment practice that has a disproportionate impact upon females ab-
sent a legitimate governmental interest or BFOQ.219 
Unlike other private conduct, the legislature has already chosen 
to regulate employer/employee relations by enacting Title VII. Reg-
ulation of this relationship, coupled with the strong constitutional 
policy protecting the right to privacy, militates against distorting 
of habitual criminals forever deprives a basic liberty). Although the policy in Skinner provided 
for mandatory sterilization for criminals guilty of crimes of moral turpitude, id. at 536, fetal 
protection policies may also be interpreted as requiring mandatory sterilization because women 
may see no other choice but to maintain their employment. 
212 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976). 
213 See Gardner v. National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249, 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
214 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
215Id. at 14. 
216 Two cases that have applied constitutional scrutiny to private conduct are Shelley, 334 
U.S. 1 (1948) (court could not enforce restrictive covenant between private buyer and seller 
without violating the fourteenth amendment rights guaranteed to blacks) and Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (court cannot enter order denying custody to mother because of 
relationship with black man without violating the fourteenth amendment). These cases would 
most likely be limited to their facts because they involved classification based on race. Courts 
would be unlikely to rely on these decisions for classifications based on sex. 
217 See Gardner, 434 F. Supp. at 258. 
218Id. 
219Id. 
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traditional Title VII framework to affirm fetal protection policies. 
Thus, despite the lack of state action, courts should import all the 
constitu[;ional privacy concerns into Title VII. 
If constitutional privacy concerns are imported to Title VII, the 
future of fetal protection policies would be affected. The judiciary 
would be precluded from distorting the framework of Title VII to 
exclude fertile and pregnant women from proper Title VII coverage 
in an effort to protect the health of their offspring. Thus, employers 
would be unable to institute fetal protection policies lawfully unless 
pregnancy or fertility constituted a BFOQ. 
Invalidating these policies as a means of coping with reproductive 
hazards in the workplace will force employers to confront the situ-
ation directly without violating either Title VII's promise of equality 
and choice or the OSH Act's goal of eliminating workplace hazards. 
Workable alternatives to fetal protection policies certainly exist, 
including ones that will assist women in making the best decisions 
for themselves regarding reproductive hazards. 
C. An Alternative to Fetal Protection Policies 
Proper Title VII analysis of fetal protection policies precludes 
anyone, other than the woman herself, from making the decision 
concerning continued employment in a reproductively hazardous 
workplace. Consequently, employers must take an alternative course 
of action in complying with the OSH Act's requirement of furnishing 
a safe workplace for all employees, protecting the health of the next 
generation, and mitigating future tort liability. Employers could 
institute a program with an objective of assisting each woman at 
risk in making the best possible decision for herself. Such a program 
should consist of education regarding the reproductive hazards pres-
ent in the workplace, and employment options for employees at risk. 
Lack of education is one of the primary problems in the area of 
reproductive hazards in the workplace. 22o Evidence of confusion and 
lack of awareness permeate industries in which work conditions 
expose employees to reproductive hazards. 221 A 1988 Massachusetts 
study conducted by the University of Massachusetts Medical Center 
and the Department of Health, which surveyed 198 chemical, com-
puter, and electronic firms, found that fifty-three percent of those 
220 See generally Butterfield, Study Says Job Hazards Go Unrecognized, Boston Globe, 
Nov. 11, 1988, at 1. 
221 I d. at 12. 
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firms used at least one of four known reproductively hazardous 
chemicals. 222 Only forty percent of the firms using these substances, 
however, were aware of the possible adverse effects on reproduction, 
while only twenty percent restricted workers' exposure to these 
substances. 223 The study also reported that the firms restricting 
workers often followed discriminatory practices and mistakenly re-
moved workers who were at a low risk, while leaving the high-risk 
workers in the workplace. 224 None of the companies surveyed trans-
ferred men even when there was evidence of a reproductive risk for 
men. 225 For example, glycol ethers are known to be an even greater 
risk to the reproductive system of men than of women, yet men 
remained on the job.226 The study concluded that inaccurate infor-
mation has led employers to institute inappropriate policies in an 
effort to counteract reproductive hazards. 227 
The first goal of education would be to ensure that employers take 
appropriate, nondiscriminatory action toward employees at risk. The 
education of all employers in a specific industry would promote rec-
ognition of reproductive hazards industry-wide and would allow for 
a .concerted effort and pooling of resources to discover methods for 
abatement of the hazards apart from the exclusion of pregnant and 
fertile women. 228 In fact, many of the major firms in the industry 
are already moving toward a substitution of nonhazardous chemicals 
for hazardous chemicals. 229 Moreover, such information would make 
employers aware of which jobs are hazardous and which employees 
are actually at risk, whether it be pregnant women, fertile women, 
fertile men, or all workers. This knowledge in turn should be used 
to educate the employees about reproductive hazards and to struc-
ture an appropriate options program for employees at risk. 
Education for employees is necessary as well to assist each indi-
vidual in reaching the best decision regarding the individual's em-
222 See id. at 1, 12. These four reproductive hazards were glycol ethers, lead, organic 
mercury, and radiation. Id. at 12. 
223 I d. at 12. 
224Id. at 1, 12. 
225Id. at 12. 
226Id. 
227Id. 
228 Abatement could take various forms, such as new safety equipment, safety guidelines, 
discovery of chemical substitutes, new methods using lower levels of hazardous substances, 
and nonhazardous substances. 
229 Statement by Christopher Anderson, spokesperson for the Massachusetts High Tech 
Council. I d. at 12. 
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ployment. 230 A thorough and accurate knowledge of all the potential 
adverse effects associated with one's job, as well as the probability 
of occurrence, is necessary for employees to make an informed choice 
whether to remain in that job or to pursue other options. 
The second prong of an alternative program should provide at-
tractive options to the employee at risk. Often, an employee would 
rather bear the risk of development of reproductive problems than 
face unemployment, which has its own adverse effects. 231 In contrast, 
if employers provided reasonable options, employees might view the 
situation as presenting something other than a Hobson's choice. 232 
The available options should be tailored to those general categories 
of employees affected as well as to feasible options within the indus-
try. These options could include permanent or temporary transfers 
within the company to other jobs comparable in level and pay, re-
ciprocal transfers between industries or employers to comparable 
positions, nine-month paid maternity leave, alternative career coun-
seling and placement, and continuing education with reemployment 
in less hazardous jobs. Creative and numerous options in conjunction 
with education as to the potential risks would allow the individual 
to reach a healthy and more personally fulfilling decision. 
Programs designed to assist employees in making decisions about 
potential reproductive risks are the only viable alternative to fetal 
protection policies. Although the best solution would be to remove 
all toxic substances from the workplace, it is an unrealistic alterna-
tive. Nonetheless, banning fetal protection policies and forcing em-
230 The Massachusetts study also found that less than half of the firms using substances 
hazardous to reproduction informed their employees of the potential risks. Id. 
231 Some employees are willing to neither risk development of a reproductive hazard nor 
suffer the effects of unemployment, and consequently have been forced to give up their fertility 
to maintain their employment status. See, e.g., Oil, Chern. & Atomic Workers v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
When Judge Bork was asked about his ruling in American Cyanamid during the nomination 
proceedings, he stated, "I suppose the five women who chose to stay on that job with higher 
pay and [who] chose sterilization-I suppose that they were glad to have the choice." Toten-
berg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1213, 1222 (1988). Betty Riggs, one of the women who had been sterilized, responded 
to Judge Bork's comment, stating, "I cannot believe that [he] thinks we were glad to have 
the choice of getting sterilized or getting fired .... I was only [twenty-six] years old, but I 
had to work, so I had no choice .... This was the most awful thing that happened to me." 
Id. 
232 The Massachusetts study found that only 13% of the firms surveyed allowed for voluntary 
transfers, which generally were restricted to pregnant women. Butterfield, Study Says Job 
Hazards Go Unrecognized, Boston Globe, Nov. 11, 1988, at 12. Furthermore, no men were 
allowed transfers from jobs involving substances known to affect reproduction in men. Id. 
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ployers to institute an alternative program may provide an impetus 
to make the workplace safer for all employees. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Employers justify fetal protection policies as a means to protect 
employees' offspring and as a means to insure against future tort 
liability. The courts have rejected such an economic argument, but 
appear, however, to be concerned by the moral question presented 
by reproductive hazards in the workplace. The courts have decided 
that protecting the future generation should prevail over women's 
rights as employees. Thus, courts have proceeded to distort Title 
VII principles, providing the employer with a viable defense to sex 
discrimination allegations where none previously existed, thereby 
validating fetal protection policies. These policies supposedly pro-
mote the health of our future generation, but at the expense of 
women's rights. 
Fetal protection policies are at odds with the purpose of Title VII 
and the PDA. These policies also implicate women's constitutionally 
protected right to privacy, specifically in the area of procreation. 
This infringement mandates an importation of the constitutional pri-
vacy concerns to Title VII to invalidate fetal protection policies 
unless they comply with traditional Title VII requirements. 
Consequently, the scenario established in this Comment is one 
where women can rarely be mandatorily excluded from employment 
because of reproductive hazards. Thus, the only person left to make 
the decision is the woman herself. This approach will force employers 
to take alternative routes. This Comment suggests a program con-
sisting of education and employment options in order to assist women 
in making rational decisions for themselves. 
Over time, this approach should also promote the health of all 
employees' offspring and help employers avoid future tort liability. 
Banning fetal protection policies as a means of complying with the 
OSH Act and discharging a moral duty will force employers to make 
the workplace safer for all their employees, from reproductive as 
well as nonreproductive hazards. 
